1. University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh; md.awal982@yahoo.com

*             Correspondence: md.awal982@yahoo.com

Keywords: US-led campaign, sanctions, nuclear power, aid

1. INTRODUCTION

When applied to the field of international economics, the term “economic sanctions” refers to the deliberate and government-initiated severing of financial ties or customary trade, as well as any threatening remarks regarding such a severing occurring. The term “customary trade” is used to describe the kinds of commercial and financial transactions that would have most likely taken place in the absence of sanctions, as stated by Hufbauer et al. (2007):. By restricting exports, imposing restrictions on imports, or obstructing the flow of finance (which may include allocating or seizing assets belonging to the target state), a Sender state may attempt to impose costs on its Target state (Drury, 2005:30). In order to achieve this objective, these strategies could be utilized. Since 1998, the United States has been facing new threats to its national security interests as a result of Pakistan’s emergence as a nuclear power during that same year. The United States swiftly imposed sanctions on Pakistan as a form of retaliation for the nuclear tests that Pakistan attempted. According to Morrow and Carriere (1999), the sanctions were gradually weakened as a result of the resumption of trade and other programmers in accordance with the declaration made by the president that the “Relief Act” In the event that conflicts are resolved and policies are rethought to focus more on cooperation rather than coercion, Batmanghelidi (2019) asserts that in order to drop sanctions in an effective manner, it is necessary to go beyond merely taking the step of providing relief. An alteration in the goals of American foreign policy was brought about by the events that occurred on September 11, 2001, which ultimately led to a rethinking of the way the United States approaches Pakistan. When the United States acknowledged Pakistan’s support for the fight against terrorism, they did so by providing Pakistan with both economic and military assistance. The United States of America’s national security interests were taken into consideration that led to this action being taken. The economic consequences of the global transfer will be felt by the donor state, while the recipient state will reap the benefits of the global transfer economically. This is a widely held belief. Giving money to other countries is frequently considered to be a compassionate policy, a political investment, a security investment, or a form of compensation for liberalizing trade, which comes at a cost financially (Lahiri, 2007: 155). This is due to the fact that giving money to other countries occurs. Foreign aid is defined as “money, technical assistance, and commodities” that are given to other states with the intention of assist the interests of either the state that provides the aid or the state that receives the aid, as stated by Ingram (2019). Foreign aid is a form of assistance that is provided to other states. Either a government agency or the people who live in that state can receive the assistance. Both may receive it. Humanitarian aid, assistance with development, or assistance with security are the three categories that can be applied to this assistance. As a consequence of adhering to this policy, a number of developed states are in a position to provide states that are developing or underdeveloped with financial assistance or international aid. Pakistan has been able to outrank the potentially negative effects of sanctions, both before and after it became a nuclear power. This has been the case both before and after Pakistan became a nuclear power. Pakistan needed to make sure that it was safe in order to protect its most valuable asset, which is the level of national security that it maintains with India. India, which is the only nuclear power in South Asia, has issued numerous warnings to Pakistan to keep its nuclear arsenal outside of its reach. It was Pakistan’s decision to carry out nuclear weapon tests in light of the precarious situation. The United States of America imposed trade sanctions on Islamabad after the nuclear test, but these sanctions were ineffective. The United States’ efforts to provide security and aid to Pakistan played a secondary role in the process of lifting bans on the country following the intertwining of the events that occurred on September 11. The sanctions that had been imposed on Pakistan were lifted as a direct consequence of this, and the United States of America also provided Afghanistan with additional military assistance in its fight against terrorism. In 2008, civil governments had shifted their focus to spending aid on short-term development expenditures as a means of garnering support for the electoral interests they represented. This was done in order to ensure that their interests were represented. To improve the domestic financial situation of the country by reducing the costs of its operations, they did not offer the military any assistance in this endeavor. Pakistan has been receiving financial assistance from the United States in the form of reimbursement for the use of army bases located in Pakistan since the year 2001. Pakistan is utilizing a dual strategy, according to experts from the United States, in which it fights against Taliban factions on its own territory while also giving the impression that it is fighting in Afghanistan. By employing this strategy, Pakistan is able to push forward its own interests in Afghanistan while simultaneously thwarting the influence of India, which is Pakistan’s adversary nation. Furthermore, the assistance provided by the United States for the purpose of socioeconomic development did not affect the quality of life of individuals or make a contribution to the alleviation of poverty. It instead had the effect of weakening civil society while simultaneously strengthening the military through the provision of assistance in the form of military aid. In the decision to favor Pakistan by lifting the sanctions and providing aid, the United States was motivated by its own self-interest, according to the experts, and Pakistan was motivated to use some of the aid it received for the purposes of military establishment and development. Both of these statements are in agreement. The government of the United States has utilized a wide range of economic instruments as special trade measures in the aftermath of the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. These include the lifting of sanctions in conjunction with the provision of loans in order to reward allies and the imposition of new sanctions in order to frighten competitors. This policy of sanctions is being implemented in the form of both a stick and a carrot, which is an additional point of interest.

2. The Emergence of Pakistan as a Nuclear State and US Sanctions

When it comes to achieving their objectives, a sizeable number of sending states resort to the use of economic sanctions against target states. The effectiveness of the sanctions will be determined by the goals that are established by the state that is going to be the recipient of the sanctions. Sanctions are based on a theoretical foundation that produces a dissuasive effect with the intention of gaining the consent of the state that issued the sanctions. It is important to note, however, that in order for this strategy to be successful, the state that imposes sanctions must do so with the firm belief that there is no way for the state that is the target of the sanctions to avoid the negative consequences that are associated with those sanctions. Slaughter (2011) makes reference to the claim that realists have over the vision of the world that can be characterized by four assumptions. In the first place, the primary objective of every nation is to ensure its own survival; in the second place, states should be rational players; in the third place, every nation possesses some military capability and is uncertain about the states that are its neighbors; and in the fourth place, nations that possess strong economic power and military are decisive. It is pointed out by Slaughter (2011) that the Realists’ claim to victory over the vision of the world is based on these assumptions. It has been reported by Tobin that India and Pakistan have not signed the agreement because they are of the opinion that it is discriminatory towards them. Specifically, this is due to the fact that the “big five” nations, which include the United States of America, China, France, the United Kingdom, and Russia, permit themselves to acquire nuclear arsenals while simultaneously prohibiting other nations from fabricating such arsenals. The other states are kept in a state of heightened awareness regarding any potential escalation that may take place as a result of this posture, which is taken against the backdrop of the unresolved border dispute between them. It is interesting to note that Pakistan began its nuclear efforts in 1955, with peaceful concerns, by taking advantage of the ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme that was being run by the president of the United States at the time, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and signing the cooperative agreement (Fitzpatrick, 2014: 13). This was done in order to move forward with its nuclear programme. Sanctions were placed on Pakistan by the United States of America in 1998, following the country’s success in conducting nuclear tests. Furthermore, Pakistan was subject to the implementation of Section 102 (b) of the “Arms Export Control Act” (Arms Control Association, 2001). This was accomplished by the government of Pakistan. In an effort to put pressure on Pakistan to cease their activities, the sanctions were reinstated by the Clinton administration. This was done in order to achieve the desired result. It was on June 18, 1998 that the Department of State of the United States of America provided an explanation regarding the particulars of the sanctions that had been imposed on Pakistan and India. They additionally stated in a statement that “we want to convey a message to the nuclear state of Pakistan and India through these sanctions that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) should be signed by Pakistan, not employ nuclear weapons, keep up limitations on rationing out the weapons with other states, and turn down the tension on the Kashmir issue between them” (Rennack, year 1998). Pakistan’s policy of nuclear ambivalence, which it had maintained since the 1980s, was finally put to an end when the country carried out a number of nuclear tests and detonated nuclear devices. As a consequence of Pakistan’s adherence to this policy, the nation had neither renounced nor acquired nuclear weapons that were capable of being weaponized overtly. The decision was arrived at through a cooperative effort between the bureaucracy of the government, the military, and nuclear scientists (Ahmed, 1999). Following the military coup that took place in 1999, the United States of America made it illegal for Pakistan to receive financial assistance and the sale of military equipment (Panday, 2018). On the other hand, the United States of America did allow for the sale of agricultural products, as well as the provision of loans and funding for educational programmes. The Arms Control Association (2001) reports that in the year 2000, Pakistan’s Ministry of Defense, Space and Atmospheric Commission, and National Development Complex were subjected to sanctions under the Arms Export Control Act. These sanctions were imposed on them because they intended to import Chinese missile components and technology the following year. The “Legislative Sanctions based on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961” were put into effect during the years 2017 and 2018, according to Panday (2018). As a form of austerity measure, President Trump has made the decision to suspend military assistance to Pakistan. This decision comes despite the fact that the United States has repeatedly exerted pressure on Pakistan. The following is a statement that he made in a tweet: “The United States had foolishly handed Pakistan more than $33 billion in aid over the past 15 years and had been rewarded with nothing but lies and deceit” (The EurAsian Times, 2020). The United States has imposed sanctions on Pakistan by withholding economic and military assistance during a variety of crucial moments due to the fact that the United States has imposed sanctions on Pakistan. This has characterized the relationship between the United States and Pakistan. The outcomes of the sanctions are evidence that Pakistan has not responded to the sanctions in a manner that is considered to be serious. Threats, punishments, and sanctions would not be able to deter Pakistan from conducting nuclear tests. Pakistan would continue to carry out nuclear tests.

3. An Analysis of Effectiveness of US Sanctions on Pakistan

Sanctions are macroeconomic events, so their effects should be assessed in terms of policy-caused economic harm, with a focus on the socioeconomic groups struck hardest by sanctions. Sanctions are preferable to negotiations, conciliation, or war, but many academics believe they are pointless. This applies regardless of whether the military option is initially discussed. Diplomats use economic sanctions to change the political policies of the targeted state. These macroeconomic policies also transfer economically coercive outcomes from the sender to the target state (Eyeler, 2007: 4-5). This allows us to evaluate US policies in Pakistan. Schott (1998) claims that US sanctions would not deter Pakistan from nuclear testing. Despite the fact that such tests could cost Pakistan a lot. It claims that its national security interests were at risk, outweighing the possibility of economic losses from the sanctions. Other states were expected to not replicate the US’s actions, and if they did, they would be temporary for political and altruistic reasons. According to Drury (2005:34), Pakistan must have known that the US would likely sanction it if a nuclear device was detonated. After Pakistan’s nuclear device tests, Frorino (2018) notes that the sanctions’ negative effects are outweighed by their potential benefits. Pakistan was unconcerned about US sanctions after these debates. Globalization allows target states to use international trade and capital markets and find alternative product and capital suppliers (Schott, 1998). This has made sanctions less effective. CIA warned in June 1998 that Pakistan’s growing dependence on Iran and other Muslim countries to avoid economic and political collapse could lead to the sale of nuclear technology to Iran or other countries, according to Fitzpatrick (2014). Collaboration with the US is also harmed. US sanctions on Pakistan failed when Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998 (Case 73-3) and 1979-2. The 1994 Glenn Amendment to the US Arms Export Control Act accelerated commercial transactions and increased US aid to Pakistan. Additionally, US sanctions against Pakistan (Case 99-3) had little to no effect (Hufbauer et al., 2007:110). According to the Act, the president had to cut off financial aid and limit exports, including agricultural products, to states that detonate nuclear devices to reduce nuclear proliferation. The possibility of cancelling large grain shipments to Pakistan led to new legislation that gave the president the power to waive the Glenn Amendment for a year. However, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks made lifting sanctions against Pakistan urgent. This state pretended to be searching for Osama bin Laden, the main suspect in the attacks, who was believed to be hiding in Afghanistan. In exchange, the US gave Pakistan money and stopped collecting its debts. President Bush lifted Pakistan sanctions after three years to protect US national security. Some (Krishnadas, 2001) claim Pakistan has offered the US airspace and intelligence to fight terrorism. President George W. Bush said lifting the sanctions would help us achieve our goals with Pakistan, including supporting its fight against terrorism. Schweid (2001) says we must act quickly to work together. This led the US to lift sanctions against Pakistan in 2001 to secure its cooperation against al-Qaida and the Taliban. That allowed Pakistan to get debt relief. Washington expected these actions to help President Pervez Musharraf maintain his political cover for his controversial decision to help the US kill Osama bin Laden. Humanitarian aid was initially needed to help Afghans and show the US that it was not at war with Islam or Afghanis. Pakistani anti-Americanism and government opposition have increased since the Afghanistan strikes. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme is based on nuclear deterrence, the idea that a weaker state can deter a powerful and influential adversary by threatening remarks or using its atomic capacity (Ong, 2016). The nuclear smuggling network led by Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan is credited with keeping nuclear proliferation at bay. This network supplied Iran and North Korea with nuclear technology, prowess, and schemes for over two decades until 2004 (Ong, 2016). Levy and Scott-Clark (2007:2) reported that the US, UK, and other European nations allowed Pakistan to acquire highly restricted nuclear technology over three decades. Endorsing unrealistic nuclear goals gave US foreign policy many advantages in South Asia (Haass & Halperin, 1998). Some believe US sanctions against Pakistan have failed and will continue to fail. The “global antiterrorism campaign” has focused on Pakistan since September 11, 2001. Ganguly and Kapur (2010) say Pakistan will affect the alliance’s efforts to expel the Taliban and stabilise Afghanistan.According to Cronin, Kronstadt, and Squassoni (2005), US efforts in Pakistan have failed. Both countries, those who imposed or were hit by sanctions, suffered economic punishment. If economic sanctions fail, the economy may suffer. Hostile countries often try to gain an advantage by establishing diplomatic relations with sanctioned nations. A single nation’s sanctions may succeed if supported by a strong coalition of states and international institutions and effectively implemented. Because of this, US sanctions against Pakistan were ineffective.

4. Who benefited from US Aid in Pakistan?

Pakistan pursues its own and the US’s goals while the US seeks to increase its military aid return. Pakistan’s collaboration with the US after September 11, 2001, has caused socio-political divisions and economic and infrastructure destabilisation. Foreign aid is one of the “real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practise of foreign policy and one of the fathers of the study of relations between states” (Lancaster, 2007). Lawson and Mongestern 2020 state that the US government only provides economic and military aid. The US provides military and economic aid to Pakistan. The US population seeks apparent interests to help Pakistan. Since 2001, experts from various fields agree that US aid money in Pakistan has not been misused. Pakistan seeks US help to end its defiance and prevent mental instability. However, Ibrahim (2009) reports that international experts agree that Pakistan has not spent US aid efficiently over the past two decades. Pakistan can improve the problem by collaborating to lower barriers. Pakistan must express concern about using aid for nuclear purposes. It should not cut aid to boost military spending. From the 1950s to the 1960s, American aid to Pakistan focused on economic growth, particularly for civilians. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the US’s fight against the Soviets boosted Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies. USAID’s development projects, food aid, and humanitarian aid were crucial. Pakistan, an aid-dependent nation, received $73.1 billion in bilateral and multilateral foreign development assistance between 1960 and 2002. About 30% of the aid was bilateral from the US. Pakistani leaders, especially military leaders, supported the US during the cold war. Pakistan did little to benefit the Pakistani population from 1971 to 2001, nor did it use US aid for self-sustaining growth or cold war goals. Pakistan also did not use US aid for self-sustaining growth. After September 11, 2001, the US paid Pakistan to cooperate against terrorism (Zaidi, 2011). Pakistan spent 10% of its 2002–2008 budget on development and 75% on the military. Assistance has traditionally focused on not providing economic aid (Dawn, 2011). It is widely believed that aid was provided after September 11 to fight terrorism, but this assistance did not help acquire military capabilities. Instead, counterterrorism operations made incremental progress. Pakistan’s military has grown thanks to US military aid, but its civilian government, democratic institutions, and people have not. The US has focused on sustained engagement in Pakistan’s development since 2008. This shift addressed two countries’ goals and interests. According to Hussain and Takar (2018), the US has given Pakistan, Afghanistan’s neighbour, financial aid to fight terrorism and expel terrorists. Aid has been given to Afghanistan to eliminate terrorists. Pakistan was eligible for US military and economic aid as the third-largest beneficiary. Pakistan received $33.4 billion in US economic aid from 2002 to 2018. The funds’ use was not disclosed by Pakistan. Government agencies in two countries report that the Pakistani army has received $14.5 billion for anti-terrorism operations. Pakistan received the remaining $18.8 billion in economic aid. However, Pakistan has failed to convince the US that it is using aid as directed. The presented costs are much higher than routine operations. US relies on Pakistani military to patrol western border and drive terrorists and extremists out of safe havens. Hussain and Takar (2018) state that the US Congress and people believe Pakistan is not benefiting from US aid. The last money-spending checks were found 73 years ago. The US believes its aid to Pakistan has had little positive effect. The Pakistani military failed to defeat terrorism with the US government’s help. Pakistan’s civilian and military governments have likely worked hard to combat domestic terrorism, with some success. Zaidi (2011) Before 2009, this was a “missed opportunity” to strengthen and support democratic movements and institutions. Compared to US aid, Pakistani experts say the economy relies on remittances. They believe US aid has never made up 1% of the country’s GDP. Pakistan estimates that the US’s involvement in Afghanistan has cost its economy, society, and infrastructure $68 billion. Pakistan has bought US goods to repay US military aid. The US calls a large portion of CSF funds “aid,” even though it owes Pakistan for military infrastructure (Nur, 2018). The US believes Pakistan did not use its aid to advance American interests. It continued to assist because it received enough response to consolidate its military dominance (Zaidi, 2011). In addition, it provided economic aid to improve its image among Pakistanis. Pakistan’s inability to meet its goals is shown by its aid distribution inequality. Spending money on people and social and political infrastructure can have unintended consequences due to disorganized investment management. Pakistan has supported the Taliban and other terrorist groups for years, but the US has never sanctioned it like North Korea. According to The Eurasian Times (2020), National Security Council Secretariat member Dr. Tara Kartha claims the US has avoided harsh action due to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Aid spending in the US has caused concern since the start of this decade. It appears that the Pakistani military and security services have not followed US directives. US funds have been improved to individuals, hurting Pakistani institutions and the state’s ability to fight fanatic enemies. These enhancements encourage kleptocratic institutions to commit corruption. Due to high operating costs and low aid volume, US aid in Pakistan has been ineffective. USAID’s programmes have also been hampered by funding and safety concerns. Additionally, important factors like the lack of a strategy and ineffective aid spending checks have not been prioritized. This has hindered resolution. The Pakistani military did not use the aid to fight terrorism. Ibrahim (2009) claims there is insufficient evidence of Pakistani military corruption. Due to the US aid investigation, Pakistanis avoided pandemics and saved lives. Development aid boosted the state’s economic, political, and social development. Security aid built strong armed and security forces. Instead of monetary aid, the US and other international and regional organizations provided commodities and technical assistance. Instead, US aid to Pakistan’s allies promoted regional and global peace, advancing US national security interests.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Washington and Islamabad talk, and cooperation between two states are arbitrary and insufficient, even though it shows that a coalition has benefited from cultivating and building relations as much as possible. The US’s sanctions against Pakistan for nuclear testing have failed, suggesting that the US should find better ways to engage with Pakistan. According to Drury (2005), the highhanded lifting of sanctions to benefit US interests has increased mutual mistrust and the perception of a threat to relations. After September 11, 2001, the US has focused on counterterrorism rather than population, economic, or democracy development in Pakistan. The USA hopes the Pakistani military will help fight terrorism, but both countries have different goals. The US has provided financial aid to Pakistan’s armed forces to reward their active and effective political economy participation due to misplaced trust in their capabilities. This involved circumventing the elected civilian government. The fluctuation of US aid to Pakistan over 70 years. Pakistan’s nuclear development and its role as a US ally in the fight against terrorism are their top concerns. Beneficiary-donor relations show that Pakistan served both her own and US interests. After sanctions, withdrawal, or aid cuts, Pakistan had to find other partners to help her during financial crises and for national security. Some suggest the US should help Pakistan more moderately. Decentralizing fund disbursement and monitoring investment allows it to improve people’s lives. Successfully implementing the two countries’ strategies and goals would be beneficial. US funding must be redirected to democratic processes, infrastructure improvement, and economic growth to be effective. The US cares less about Pakistan’s long-term growth, stability, and prosperity. Long-term policies can improve US-Pakistan relations. Both countries must collaborate to improve national security, and the US should strengthen its ties with the government, military, and people. The US should focus on giving Pakistan’s youth opportunities through various programmes to provide structural support. In Pakistan, Americans and others view American aid recipients differently. Even though Pakistanis have benefited from US aid, they still dislike the US. The US has promoted Pakistan’s social, economic, and overall well-being through its assistance. Aid benefited bureaucrats, upper-class groups, and privileged individuals, but not many societal classes. Because it was not provided individually, it has not reached the poor or lower class. It is urgent to rethink and refocus US aid for self-sustaining economic growth and constructive purposes. Pakistan may need aid to build institutions. It is true that the US has directly dealt with the Pakistani military rather than funding civilian governments elected by the people. Policy and practice changes have kept Pakistan a hybrid military-civilian nation. The US shows it cares about Pakistanis by providing developmental aid to improve education. The US funding such interests will help build a stable and long-term relationship between the two countries. Income, living standards, and poverty reduction can be improved by the primary sector.

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