1. Department of Sociology, Government College University Faisalabad; saima_mumtaz2018@gmail.com

* Correspondence: saima_mumtaz2018@gmail.com

Keywords: Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh War

1. INTRODUCTION

In September 2021, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan conducted a military exercise in Azerbaijan, as well as in the Caspian Sea. This event is the origin of newly emerging geopolitics, which resulted in increased feelings of mutual and profound despondency among the participants. A phenomenon that has become a phenomenon for research scholars who are interested in the geopolitics of the Caucasus region is the fact that the tension in the relations between Azerbaijan and Iran has not only decreased but is actually increasing. The fact that Iran is preparing to invade Azerbaijan is not, however, implied by any of the recent events that have taken place in the Caucasus region. owing to the fact that Azerbaijan and Turkey will be signing a military pact in the month of June 2021. It was after both Turkey and Azerbaijan signed the Shusha Declaration that the member countries became strong military partners. This declaration required Turkey and Azerbaijan to act together in the event of an attack committed against either member. Under the terms of the treaty, the parties agreed to cooperate with one another in the event that there was a threat to their military (Shahbazov, 2021). The regions of Nagorno Karabakh that are located at the point where a trade route connects Armenia and Iran have been under the control of Azerbaijan. Following the acquisition of control of the strategic route, Azerbaijan halted the trade that was taking place between Armenia and Iran. Additionally, Azerbaijan began to impose taxes on Iranian trucks and to seize them in the event that they refused to pay the tax (Isayev & Mejlumyan, 2021). According to Khan and Haider (2021), the Armenian prime minister placed the blame for the victory of Azerbaijan over Armenia on the military presence of Pakistan in Nagorno Karabakh during the conflict between the two countries. Pakistan and Turkey played a significant role in the victory of Azerbaijan over Armenia. Azerbaijan communicated its gratitude to Pakistan and Turkey for their support of Azerbaijan following the conclusion of the war. Additionally, the people of Azerbaijan expressed their appreciation for the raising of Pakistani flags in the region. Additionally, despite Iran’s objections, Azerbaijan extended an invitation to Pakistan and Turkey to participate in a joint military exercise in Baku. The exercise was scheduled to last for a period of two weeks. The purpose of this study is to provide an explanation of the newly developed geopolitics in the Caucasus region following the victory of Azerbaijan over Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh region with the assistance being provided by Pakistan and Turkey. Iran’s trade with Armenia, Russia, and other countries had a route that passed through the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which was formerly under the control of Armenia. A sense of apprehension was generated as a result of the military presence of Pakistan and Turkey, as well as the presence of Israeli personnel on the bordering region of Iran, which led to Iran developing a counter-strategy. Pakistan’s new engagements in the Caucasus region have a negative impact on the country’s relations with Iran, but they may lead to the opening of new horizons for economic and security cooperation between the two countries. (Lindenstrauss & Celniker, 2012) investigated the primary factors that contributed to the existing tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan in the year 2012. Because during that time period, both countries had summoned their ambassadors for the purpose of “consultations” following potential terrorist attacks on Azerbaijani territory that were carried out by Iran. A few of the indications of that hostility include the detention of citizens for compelling reasons and an increase in the presence of Iranian naval forces in the Caspian Sea. By looking at the development of hostility from both a short-term and a long-term perspective, the authors had investigated the phenomenon. They came to the conclusion that the relationship between the two countries had been strong ever since Azerbaijan gained its independence in 1991, which meant that any disagreement was not surprising. In addition, this strain, which is distinct in comparison to the strains that have been experienced in previous years, could be characterized by the strengthening of the economy and the invitation extended by Azerbaijan to other countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, and Israel to visit its territory.

2. CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The military exercise known as the “Three Brothers Drill” brought about significant shifts in the geopolitical landscape of the Caucasus region. This was due to the fact that Iran was unable to conceal its dissatisfaction during the exercise, which took place in September 2021. Iran expressed its dissatisfaction through its proxies and then directly. It was during the Friday prayer sermon that Syed Hassan Ameli made the initial comment regarding the tripartite exercise that was being conducted in Azerbaijan. As the religious leader of Iran’s delegation in the Ardabil region of Azerbaijan, he is regarded as a representative of Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran in Azerbaijan. He is also the current leader of the Iranian delegation. Syed Hassan Ameli issued a warning to Azerbaijan, advising them not to mess with a lion’s tail, and he urged the Islamic Revolutionary Guard of Iran to show its strength in Azerbaijan. It was the phrases of the Ardabil Friday prayers that prompted Iran and Azerbaijan to threaten each other (Rad, 2021). Syed Hassan Ameli suggested that Iran begin its own military exercise close to the border with Azerbaijan. Iran responded by initiating the exercise. There is a significant deployment of the Sarollah Division of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on the northwest frontier. At some point during the exercise, Baku fired at an Iranian helicopter. Iranians on social media demanded the hashtag “Death to Baku” in response to their requests for a prompt response to the situation. In response to the Ameli warning to Azerbaijan to refrain from playing with the lion’s tail, Elman Mammadov, a member of the Azerbaijani parliament, stated that if Iran had a tail, Azerbaijan would cut it off. In response to the statement made by Elman Mammadov, Iran’s representative in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, Ahmad Naderi stated that Iran’s patience was evidence of the country’s greatness and that countries that considered themselves to be friendly neighbors were obligated to adhere to the principles of good neighborliness. It should not come as a surprise that Azerbaijan has also placed antiaircraft infrastructures close to its capital. This is because Mohammad Bagheri, the chief of staff of Iran, has stated that if the conflict were to begin, “the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps will strike Azerbaijan with 4,000 missiles, which will completely destroy it.” Furthermore, Colonel Hossein Pursmail, who is in charge of the forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Tabriz, stated that “repeating Israel’s warnings against Iran through the mouth of Baku is not only not in Azerbaijan’s interests, but it is also a threat to its own survival, which is why Iran has limited options.” The year 2021, Mikovic. The leader of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, Sardar Jalaloglu, made the following statement in response to the exercises conducted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): “As soon as Iran strikes against us, Pakistani forces will be in Tehran.” This statement, which said, “Iran must not engage in such behavior!” brought Pakistan to the forefront of the discussion. In the past, the history of relations between Pakistan and Iran looked very different from what they are today. The new geopolitical dimensions of Pakistan’s approach to the Caucus region and its relationship with Iran and Azerbaijan were brought to light by a statement made by Sardar Jalal Oglu. The Iranian military exercises that took place in September 2021 appear to be sending a more clarified message, and they have been supported by a tidal wave of triumphalist broadsword from Iran (Club-2021). Hossein Dalirian, a commentator who has been linked to the Iranian military, posted the following tweet on September 30, 2021: “Imagine a battle with Azerbaijan. Additionally, he boasted that Iran was capable of firing one thousand ballistic missiles and hitting one thousand targets in the country of Azerbaijan. He asserted that the conflict would be resolved in a single day, and that Azerbaijan would have no time to employ any other strategies (Dalirian, 2021). A person from Azerbaijan responded to his comment by saying, “Pay no attention to boasting.” In a statement released on September 27, 2021, President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan voiced his displeasure with the beginning of the Iranian military drill. He expressed his astounded astonishment at the fact that any military exercise could be carried out on the territory of any nation because it was within their legal rights to do so. On the other hand, why did Iran choose to conduct a triparty exercise on its border at the same time that Azerbaijan is hosting the exercise? That is, Sofuoglu (2021). A pro-Iranian preacher was taken into custody by Azerbaijan, alongside the closure of a Masjid and a website based in Iran that was based in Azerbaijan. During his explanation, Aliyev stated that this was the first time since the dissolution of the Soviet Union that Iran had organized such a display of force so close to the border of Azerbaijan. When he stated on October 15, 2021 that Azerbaijan had stopped a drug trafficking route from Iran through [the] Jabrayil province of Azerbaijan to Armenia and then on to Europe, he once again infuriated Iran. He said that this route extended from Iran to Armenia and then to Europe. This was something that he revealed during the summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), according to Aliyev (2021). Azerbaijan’s president had ignored the customs and requirements of the neighborhood, and he had made false and negative statements that were not a sign of good faith and farsightedness, according to Mahmoud Abbaszadeh, a spokesperson for the Iranian parliamentary committee, and Ali Shamkahni, the secretary of the supreme national security council of Iran, who responded to him by saying that he had made statements that were not a sign of good faith and farsightedness (Sinaee, 2021).

2.1 Israel Perspective

Saeed Khatibzada, the spokesperson for Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that military drills in the northwestern border regions of Iran were a concern of Iranian sovereign rights and that Iran would take all reasonable steps for its national defense. In addition, he stated, without mentioning Israel, that Iran would not tolerate the presence of a Jewish regime in close proximity to its border. Iranian sensitivity to its border with Azerbaijan has increased since the new regime of Naftali, according to Kioumars Heydari, the commander of Iranian land forces. He also stated that Israeli operations in that region were fully under the observation of the Iranians (“Iran says military exercises near Azeri border an issue of’sovereignty'”, 2021). According to statements made by Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), on September 29, 2021, Iran would not permit its neighbors to become a sanctuary and a base for Iran’s anti-security actions against the Israeli regime, which is a fake regime (“No Place for Israel in Iran’s Neighboring Countries: IRGC General – Politics news”, 2021). Additionally, he stated that there was no doubt that the Israeli regime had assisted and supported the specific regional states with the intention of constructing divergences and rifts among Muslim countries. He also stated that Azerbaijan and other regional players were more aware than anyone else of the reasons behind Iran’s war games. It is a well-known fact that Azerbaijan and Israel have had long-standing relations in the field of defense; however, it is the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh that brought these relations into the spotlight. During his meeting with the Azerbaijan ambassador to Iran on September 30, 2021, Hussain Amir-Abdollahian issued a warning to Azerbaijan, stating that Iran would not tolerate the presence of the Zionist government on its borders, as well as the movement of the Zionist government, which posed a threat to Iran’s national security (“Amirabdollahian: Iran does not tolerate Zionist regime’s presence near its borders”, 2021). What would Pakistan’s stance be in the event of a direct or indirect confrontation between Iran and Azerbaijan, in which Israel would play a role? This is the question that needs to be answered with regard to Pakistan.

2.2 Turkey Foreign Policy

Iran’s foreign policy experts are concerned that Turkey and Azerbaijan are attempting to encircle Iran and sow instability among the Azeri ethnic minority of Iran. This is a fear that is shared by the Iranian government. That Turkey seemed to be completely oblivious to Iran’s concerns was a source of irritation for Iran. In December of 2020, Recep Tayyip Erdogan recited a poem in which he expressed his regret over the division of Azeris along the Aras River. In the poem, he also indirectly supported panTurkism, which resulted in a furious protest in Iran. The Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, has expressed his disapproval of recent statements made by the President of Turkey, who stated that Iran would not risk a confrontation with Azerbaijan due to the fact that it has its own Azeri population. It was an apparent reference to make claims that Turkey was busy in the recruitment of Islamists to go and fight in Syria against the pro-Iran Asad regime. Kioumars Heydari, the commander of Iranian land forces, expressed concern over the presence of some Syrian armed groups. He made this statement in reference to the fact that Turkey was reportedly recruiting Islamists. Iran was uncertain as to whether or not the fighters had left the region, according to Heydari (Esfandiari, 2021). Regarding the strengthening of ties between Iran and Armenia, Turkey is expressed concern. According to the explanation provided by the Turkish president, the reason why Iran was unable to maintain its antagonistic attitude toward Azerbaijan was because of the influence that Azerbaijani influence had within Iran. He stated that Iran could not insult and humiliate its own large Azerbaijani community by targeting Azerbaijan. He did not believe that Iran could do so. Any escalation that takes place between Iran and Turkey will also have repercussions for Pakistan. Iran is a neighboring state, and Pakistan has developed a close relationship with Turkey. In light of the current conflict between Turkey and Iran, Pakistan is obligated to give some consideration to the situation.

2.3 Trade Routes through Armenia

In September of the previous year, Azerbaijan and Armenia engaged in a conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which is a contentious issue. Azerbaijan occupied a significant portion of Karabakh during the six-week conflict, which resulted in the loss of approximately 6,000 lives. Iran’s trade routes have been severely disrupted as a result of Azerbaijan’s annexation of the region from Iran. Iran was quietly supporting Armenia during the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Azerbaijan, like Iran, is a country with a Shiite majority population. According to Oxford Analytica (2021), Iran is currently under the control of Azerbaijan, despite the fact that it has access to West Asia and Russia through the Karabakh trade route. Iranian truck drivers were arrested by Azerbaijan for failing to pay the transit fee, which contributed to an increase in tension in the region. The Caucasus region is characterized by a diverse ethnic composition, an abundance of energy resources, and an intersection of expanding global trade routes, all of which indicate that the competition to maintain power in this region will continue. During the time that Karabakh was under Armenian occupation, Iran was able to send goods to Russia and the Middle East via truck and other modes of transportation without having to pay any customs duties. During the conflict, Azerbaijan has taken control of the Karabakh region, which has prevented Iran from entering West Asia. Additionally, during this time, Azerbaijan has been receiving money from Iran in order to travel to Armenia. A number of repercussions have resulted from the recent animosity that has arisen between Azerbaijan and Iran. One of these repercussions is that Iran has been compelled to investigate alternative transit routes to Armenia, Georgia, and Russia. Iran’s cargo that was traveling through the Goris–Kapan highway, which is a key section of the primary land route connecting northern and southern Armenia, and a segment of a 400-kilometer road infrastructure extending from the Iranian city of Norduz to Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, was the turning point. Azerbaijan’s option to impose limitations on Iran’s cargo was the turning point. A significant portion of this roadway either directly enters the territory of Azerbaijan or crosses a section of the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan that is the subject of a dispute (Isayev and Mejlumyan, 2021). At first glance, the explanation that Azerbaijan provides regarding its policy appears to be quite simplified. The fact that it is a matter of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty and that it has the ability to collect taxes for transit from his land is something that can be said. In addition, Azerbaijan is concerned that Iranian trucks could use the route to transport weapons that could end up in the hands of Armenia, which is Azerbaijan’s adversary. Furthermore, there is a great deal of anger in Iran regarding the halting of Iranian trucks. Following the detention of two Iranian truck drivers by Azerbaijan for failing to pay a “road tax,” the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded that they be released immediately. Azerbaijan’s decision to block trucks was unacceptable to Iran because it posed a threat to the country’s ability to maintain trade security in West Asia. As the first alternative land corridor that completely circumvents the territory of Azerbaijan, the Tatev–Aghvani route is one of the most notable examples. Trucks have a difficult time traversing this route due to its steep slopes and narrow passes, which is especially problematic when it is snowing or raining. This route is notorious for its narrow passes and steep slopes. In order to demonstrate that it is serious about the road link between Armenia and West Asia, Iran intends to conduct military exercises of this nature.

2.4 Iran’s concerns over the Greater Azerbaijan Issue

There is a possibility that Iran will engage in a conflict with Azerbaijan; however, there are millions of Azerbaijanis living in Iran who could support an armed struggle conducted against Iran. Azerbaijanis who are currently residing in Iran have developed a sense of national pride as a result of their country’s victory in the war against Armenia. This suggests that Iran will give careful consideration to the possibility of engaging in conflict with Azerbaijan. There is a possibility that Iran is concerned about the influence that Azerbaijan’s victories and regional relationships will have on the population of northern Azerbaijan. The region is home to a sizeable Azeri population, which is widely regarded as the largest minority group in the country. South Azerbaijan is the name given by the majority of Azerbaijanis to the northern region of Iran, which is home to approximately 20 million people of Azerbaijani descent. The Azerbaijani people who live in northern Iran organized public celebrations after Azerbaijan’s victory in the Nagorno-Karabakh war against Armenia. They also urged the Iranian government to close the border between Iran and Armenia in light of the atrocities committed by Armenian forces against the Azerbaijani people in Nagorno Karabakh. Many Azerbaijani nationalists and intellectuals have advocated for the unification of the northern and southern parts of the country in the name of ‘Greater Azerbaijan’, which is a term that refers to the cultural and social identity of the country. All of this causes concern for Iran. While this is going on, there is currently no actual possibility of separatism occurring in Iranian Azerbaijan. When the three countries of Turkey, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan started conducting joint military exercises, this problem became even more severe. Iran wants to send a message to the Azerbaijani community by conducting its own military exercise near the border of Azerbaijan. This is in response to the fact that the joint military exercise that the three Brothers conducted on the Iranian border demonstrates to the Azerbaijani people a kind of force that is directed against Iran. It is also a signal to the Azerbaijani ethnic community, which has a significant presence in northern Iran. This community is a part of Turkey. In addition, during the wars between Azerbaijan and Armenia, there were demonstrations in the northern region of Iran that were held in support of Azerbaijan. The Iranian government is concerned about the Azerbaijani separatist community and believes that it may grow in size. This is the reason why the military drills that took place close to the border served as a signal to the Azerbaijani citizens who were living in the country. The new governor of Iran’s East Azerbaijan Province was assaulted by a person who stormed the platform and smacked him on October 23, 2021, which was another significant incident that occurred in the context of the tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan. On October 23, in the city of Tabriz, the newly elected governor, General Abedin Khorram, had just barely entered the podium when an unknown individual walked onto the stage and assaulted him without giving him any prior warning (“Iranian Governor Assaulted During Inauguration Ceremony”, 2021). According to Mohammed (2021), there are posts on social media that depict separatist slogans that are displayed on walls and boards. These slogans include “South Azerbaijan is not Iran.” Iran should be killed “by a thousand cuts,” according to Naftali Bennett, the extremist prime minister of Israel, who has made the suggestion that Iran should be killed. This has clear implications for the sovereignty of Iran, and he must mean the subsequent disintegration of Iran (Harel, 2021). Later on, Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian made an effort to normalize the situation by stating that Iran has the right to conduct drills and highlighting the “significance” of cooperation between Iran and Azerbaijan, two countries that share a border that is 700 kilometers long. Following it, Abbas Musavi, the Iranian ambassador to Azerbaijan, stated that Iran’s military maneuvers were planned ahead of time and did not constitute a “threat” to Azerbaijan.

2.5 Three Brothers-2021 Military Drill

From the 12th to the 23rd of September 2021, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Pakistan joined forces in Azerbaijan to conduct military exercises known as the Three Brothers. Turkey, which has the second-largest armed force in NATO, and Pakistan, which is the only Islamic nuclear power, both participated in the event. Turkey is the most powerful country in the region. Iran must be concerned about the situation when Pakistan and Turkey participate in military maneuvers alongside Azerbaijan, and Iran’s military maneuver [reveals] that it is anxious about the situation. Iran provided an explanation for its opposition to the “Three Brothers military drill 2021,” which is a trilateral exercise that includes Pakistan, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. Iran stated that this trilateral exercise has violated the provisions of the Convention that was agreed upon to settle the legal status of the Caspian Sea (“‘Three Brothers 2021’ Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan joint military drills conclude: Dope Desi”, 2021). Azerbaijan, Iran, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Russia are the only states that are permitted to have a military presence in this region, according to Iran. The protocol of the agreement between these states states that the presence of those states is prohibited. The fact that Pakistani and Turkish troops were present in Azerbaijan for the purpose of conducting military drills was therefore in violation of the agreement’s spirit. At the same time that this military exercise caused a standoff between Iran and Azerbaijan, it may also have an impact on the relationship between Pakistan and Iran. The Iranian government viewed these exercises as a threat to the country’s national security. Iranians justified their aggressive response by claiming that the agreements between the five countries that surround the Caspian Sea dictate that any troop presence at any location is illegal. This was the justification for making the aggressive response. In response to the “Three Brothers Drill,” Iran began conducting military drills across the border with Azerbaijan. These drills were conducted alongside the border region. Other factors that have contributed to the sensitivity of the situation include a series of military drills that have included Pakistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey, as well as an increase in the level of anti-Iranian rhetoric from Azerbaijani governments. A few days after the recent escalation between Azerbaijan and Iran over border crossing, which caused increased tensions between the two neighboring states, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan conducted combined military drills in the Caspian Sea. These drills were conducted in the Caspian Sea.

2.6 Azerbaijan & Pakistan

Armenia currently occupies seven of the districts that make up the Nagorno-Karabakh region, despite the fact that the region is officially recognized as belonging to Azerbaijan. At the end of 2016, Armenia exercised its right to veto Pakistan’s request to participate as an observer in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is led by Russia. This action further deteriorated the relationship between Armenia and Pakistan. Consequently, Azerbaijan and Pakistan became more intimate. When it came to recognizing Azerbaijan as an independent state, Pakistan was one of the first countries to get on board. The position that Azerbaijan took at the United Nations regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was one that Pakistan supported wholeheartedly. The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is comparable to that of Kashmir in many respects. The Armenian government occupied the Azerbaijani province of Nagorno-Karabakh by force after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent attainment of independence by Azerbaijan. Since then, the two nations have been engaged in a conflict that has, at times, become more intense and at other times, become less intense. Similar to Kashmir, the population of Nagorno-Karabakh is comprised of Muslims; however, the Armenian army subjected them to severe torture and compelled them to leave the region. There were thousands of Muslims who were killed as martyrs, including children and women. There has been a breach of the sanctity of mosques. For the sake of the people of Nagorno Karabakh, Azerbaijan consistently engages in armed conflict with Armenia. In the same way that Pakistan is engaged in a never-ending conflict with India over Kashmiris. As a result of the deep affection that the people of Azerbaijan have for Pakistan, the level of cooperation that exists between the two nations is continuously growing. According to various social media platforms, it appears that the flag of Pakistan is flying everywhere in Azerbaijan. What appears to be a defense agreement between Pakistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey is currently in effect. There was an announcement made by the three nations that they will purchase arms from one another. There will be a sharing of information and intelligence between the two of them. It is planned that they will participate in military training, and they will work together on a variety of defense and practical issues. There is a growing and more profound level of cooperation between them in every sphere of endeavor. Only the fact that Pakistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey are united on issues of common interest, such as the support of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, is the primary reason for the propaganda that is directed against the close working relationship between these three countries. Azerbaijan, like Turkey, is speaking out for the rights of the Muslim brothers in Kashmir. The purchase of fighter jets from Pakistan was made by Turkey. Azerbaijan intends to purchase aircraft as well as other types of weapons. In the near future, Pakistan will purchase modern tanks from Turkey. Additionally, agreements regarding cooperation in the areas of business and tourism have been signed by the three countries between them. Cooperative efforts are also being made with regard to the COVID 19 vaccine. Improvements are going to be made to the direct flights that connect Baku and Islamabad. In order to facilitate more comprehensive relations between the people of the three countries, a more comprehensive plan has been developed. In the realm of education, collaboration has also started to take place. There is also the possibility of constructing roads and railways taking into consideration. Iran asserts that the “Three Brothers Drills,” also known as the trilateral drill conducted by Pakistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey, violated the international conventions on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea that were agreed upon in 2018. These conventions state that armed forces from countries other than Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia are not permitted to have a presence in the Caspian Sea. For the time being, however, the agreement has not yet been put into effect because Iran has not yet signed it (Hunter, 2021).

2.7 North South Transport Corridor (NSTC)

For a variety of reasons, Russia and India are the two primary funders and signatories to the NSTC project. They are also outspokenly pro-Armenia, which is providing Azerbaijan with the opportunity to lean toward Pakistan. Iran’s influence on the other partners has resulted in Azerbaijan being excluded from the NSIT corridor. This decision is more likely to be attributed to the deterioration of Azerbaijan’s bilateral relationship. Armenia, along with India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Ukraine, and Belarus, is a participant in this initiative. Other participants include Belarus and Ukraine. In the meantime, Iran was the country that made the greatest contribution to the development of the National Strategic Transportation Corridor (NSTC) project. This project has the potential to become an international transportation corridor that will cross the border between Russia and Iran via Azerbaijan and connect with India via water (Chuhdhary, 2017). It is possible that the construction of the corridor could be jeopardized in the event that Iran and Azerbaijan were to engage in a significant dispute. Following the “Three Brothers Drill” that took place in September 2021, Iran has made the announcement that it has removed Azerbaijan from the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) project. This project will now connect Russia and other Eastern European countries with India through Armenia (Azerbaijani Geopolitics Sees the INSTC Reconnect with Armenia, 2021). In the context of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), this corridor has particular significance for the relations between Pakistan and India.

2.8  Zangezur Corridor (Counter strategy of Azerbaijan)

“Zangezur Corridor,” as it has been dubbed, would be a land route that would be constructed between the Nakhichevan exclave of Azerbaijan, which is located on the western side of Armenia, and the mainland of Azerbaijan, which is located on the eastern border of Armenia. Turkey, which is a close ally and an ethnolinguistic relative of the Azerbaijani people, will be able to expand its economic reach and political support through an uninterrupted view of the land route that runs from Eastern Thrace, across the Caspian Sea, and into its native homelands of Central Asia, which border China. This will allow Turkey to expand its economic reach and political support. This new development would essentially lay the foundation for the long-awaited Turanian kingdom that Turkey has been eagerly anticipating. It is a very important region for trade between Iran and Azerbaijan, and the Azerbaijani people call it Zangezur. Syunik is the name given to the southern region of Armenia within the country of Armenia. The Nakhchivan, an isolated exclave of Azerbaijan, is separated from the rest of the country by Syunik, which is a strategically important region of Armenia. Following the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh, the leadership of both Armenia and Azerbaijan is working toward restoring normalcy to their relations with one another. In light of the fact that it is only a matter of time before Turkey builds a land corridor connecting Azerbaijan not only to Nakhchivan but also to Turkey, Turkey is playing a significant role in this situation. According to Rahimov (2021), the Nakhchivan corridor, which would go around Iran, would become a component of a global commerce route that would connect China and Europe by way of the Caspian Sea. At a press conference that President Erdogan and President Aliyev attended together, President Erdogan asserted that the Zenzegur corridor will connect the world for the purposes of trade and logistical activities. The acquisition of the Zangezur Corridor affords Turkey both economic and geopolitical advantages that are comparable to, if not more so than, those of other countries. In 2013, President Xi Jinping of China made the announcement that China’s Silk Road would be inaugurated. This new double commercial corridor was designed to reestablish connections between China and its Western neighbors, which included the Middle East, Europe, and Central Asia. This project, which is also known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and is led by China, is essential to comprehending the Zangezur Corridor dispute due to the fact that the Silk Road is intended to travel through Turkey on its way to Europe while avoiding Armenia. China’s compatriots will have a significant strategic advantage thanks to their ability to avoid Armenia. It is common knowledge that China and India are the most significant competitors in Asia from a political standpoint (Escobar, 2021). Within the framework of this intricate geopolitical situation, China, Pakistan, and Turkey, which is Pakistan’s close ally, along with Azerbaijan, have established an unbreakable bond against the competing interests of India and Iran. Even if they are not particularly antagonistic, as is the case with China-Iran relations, these partnerships are real and relevant within the context of the larger economic realities that are provided by the silk route. India is developing its own economic trade route in order to avoid isolation and compete with China. This step is being taken in order to counteract the consequences of the Silk Road development. In order to avoid countries that support China’s plan, India’s intended route to the European market must, as a consequence, avoid countries such as Turkey and Azerbaijan, which are steadfast partners and political and ideological allies of Pakistan, India’s longtime adversary. This is especially important in the context of the Zangezur conflict. It is the only option available to India to export its goods to Iran through the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. This is due to the political polarization that exists in India. The items will then travel by land through Iran, crossing the Armenian border at Zangezur. This is the only safe route to the Black Sea ports of Georgia, where they will be delivered to European coasts. The items will then be transported to Europe. By capturing the Zangezur Corridor through Azerbaijan, Turkey has attempted to exert control over the economic trade routes that lead to Europe. This is done with the intention of preventing India from using Iran as a transportation hub. Through their conquest of the corridor, Turkey and Azerbaijan have nearly completely encircled Armenia. As a result, the only way to access the sea is through the border of Georgia, which is a relatively unreliable and neutral state. One of the most significant aspects of the process is that Iran does not want an alternative route to be opened in terms of energy corridors and transportation corridors. To put it another way, making sure that the Zangezur Corridor is not constructed is the primary objective of the actions that Iran is taking. General Kyumers Haydari of the Iranian military stated that they would not permit any changes to be made to the borders of the northwest region of Iran (“News Analysis: Why Iran launches military drill in NW borders?”, 2021). Therefore, it is now abundantly clear that one of the primary reasons for Iran’s actions against Azerbaijan was the blocking of the Zangezur Corridor from passing through.

3. CONCLUSION

There have been instances in which the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Turkey have provided assistance to Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and conducted joint military exercises, including one that took place close to the Iranian border in September of 2021. As a result of its successful capture of a significant portion of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan has declared that it believes it is a sovereign nation that is capable of retaking its territories and protecting its interests adequately. The alliance between Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Pakistan has wider-reaching implications, as each of these countries has committed to supporting the territorial claims of the other in Armenia, Iran, Cyprus, and Kashmir, all of which may not yet be resolved. As a result of Azerbaijan’s interpretation of Iran trade through Nagorno-Karabakh, the idea of being a part of INSTC was abandoned. It has begun construction on the Zangezur corridor, which has the potential to bring about difficulties for Iran due to the fact that it has the capability of diminishing the significance and practicability of the INSTC, which is sponsored by Iran and India. Given that the Zangezur corridor has the potential to become an extension of OBORI and connect with CPEC, it is reasonable to assume that the construction of this corridor is in Pakistan’s best interests that it be constructed. In addition, Iran served as evidence that Shia Islam, the religion upon which it bases its own identity, is nothing more than a tool for foreign policy. Because the threat of war from Iran to Baku, a nation that is predominantly Shiite, has demonstrated that sectarianism and Islamic brotherhood continue to exist in the realm of idealism rather than in the realm of physical practice. It is important to note that Iran is concerned about the growing influence of Pakistan, Turkey, and Azerbaijan in the region, and it believes that the development of cooperative procedures that are centered on the Caucasus would be counterproductive to its interests. In light of this, in the present circumstances, when discussions are taking place regarding the normalization processes on the line that separates Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, it has adopted a hostile stance toward Azerbaijan. Pakistan must work on a policy that can work in such a way that what Pakistan has gained in the Caucasus region can be maintained and relations with Iran will not be disrupted in the context of the tensions that exist between Azerbaijan and Iran.

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